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Title: Social transformation, collective categories and identity change.

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Abstract

Changes in collective categories of identity are at the core of social transformation. The causal linkages between identity change, institutional change and change in modes of practice are, however, complex. Developing and adapting ideas from Pierre Bourdieu’s work, this article shows the coexistence in tension of a plurality of elements within each collective identity category. On this basis, it proposes a typology of responses at the level of identity to socio-political change. This allows an explanation of patterns of identity change in terms of wider social processes and resource distribution, while remaining open to the sense and complexity of the individual’s experience and the moments of intentionality which arise when individuals face choices as to the direction of change. The worth of the model is shown by analysis of modes of identity change in a society presently experiencing radical change in socio-political structures - post-1998 Northern Ireland.
Social transformation, collective categories and identity change.

A succession of recent works has focused on processes of social and political transformation. In all of these analyses, the process of change in collective categories of identity is central. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly see identity change and cognitive shift as core elements common to all forms of political contestation.¹ Changes in identity and aspiration play a key analytic role in a number of studies of the new European regional-nationalisms.² In other studies of national, ethnic and social mobilization, processes of self-categorisation have been core elements of explanation.³ It is clear why identity has thus come back into analysis: it is only when institutional changes are accompanied by changing self-perceptions that new institutions begin to create new dynamics of interaction; otherwise new institutions and practices become assimilated within older meanings and oppositions.

That institutional and identity change are interrelated has its classic statement in Marx’s third thesis on Feuerbach.⁴ The question is how best to analyse and grasp the interrelations. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly argue that identity, institutional and interactive aspects are interrelated in each phase of mobilisation and contestation.⁵ They see social interactions and relations as core aspects of social life, institutionally and environmentally structured and mediated through individual perceptions, self-categorisations and interests and strategic calculations.⁶ Within this nexus, variation in identity categories is an important link in the causal chain. On the one hand, changes in
the meaning of identity categories may be key variables in the explanation of change in political and social behavior. In ethnic interface situations, for example, subtle shifts of meaning may make a difference in who is included or excluded, killed or let live, and whether peace or conflict prevails. On the other hand, change in identity categories is itself provoked by and responsive to changes in institutional structure and social practice.

The causal links between category change and interactional and institutional change are often complex with time lags. There may be gradual disruptions of cognitive categories over time, underlying concepts which are put in question, inchoate cultural unease, new practices which allow old concepts to fade into irrelevance, and these subtle changes provide the underlying conditions in which new categories suddenly become foregrounded in practice, new self-definitions are crystallized and major institutional change occurs. Gradual changes in the ‘cultural substratum’ then become threshold conditions for sudden radical category change and social transformation. In other cases, identity categories have their own inertia: imposed socio-political changes with correlative changes in social practices and incentive structures fail – at least at first – to impinge on collective categories of identity. This has been the case with European integration and with many peace settlements in situations of ethnic conflict. Short of identity change, these institutional changes remain less than transformatory; in some cases, older conflicts are simply transposed within the new structures. The key political question in such cases is whether and when identity change will follow and how it may be promoted.
Identity change is, however, complex to recognize and explain. McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly treat identity shift, in its subjective, meaningful dimension, in very broad strokes. They are concerned with shifts in macro-categories, rather than with more subtle shifts in modes of identification, categorical content and relations among categories. Yet the changes in contemporary national identity posited in the theoretical literature, to take one example, involve not just change in the bare category of nationality, but in the mode in which it is held and in its associated meanings. In practice, the changes which make major impact are not, or not solely, the giving up or adoption of a Spanish, or a European, identity, but becoming a different sort of Spanish or European.

If the fact or failure of change in collective identity categories crucially affects social behavior, what factors favour such change? A typical explanation in the literature appeals to the activity of political or ‘identity’ entrepreneurs – for example, rhetorical category formation, brokerage, definition of opportunities, manipulation of fear. These are elements in any explanation of category change, but they are not the only elements.

Political entrepreneurs are always with us and most of the time they fail to meet any public response. Then, suddenly, they mobilize the masses. Why do some entrepreneurs succeed and others fail, and why does success come when it does, rather than earlier or later? Part of the explanation lies in social structure and changing interests, but part lies in perceptions, in peoples’ sense that these are demands that they would be happy to stand behind, or that the discourse simply does not speak to their key concerns. Once again we are thrust back to the ‘cultural substratum’, the changing ways individuals and groups understand and interrelate categories.
To identify subtle changes in collective identity categories requires attention to the cultural meanings of these categories as well as to behavior and boundaries, and analysis of how these meanings are constituted and changed in different micro-contexts, as well as at the macro level. To bring meaning and variation back in makes explanation considerably more complex. I argue in this article that it is possible, at least when we focus on a few politically crucial meanings of identity categories (in this article on the interrelations of oppositional meanings and substantive values within the same national identity categories). It is also worthwhile: it allows us to discover patterns in the ways in which collective categories are used and reshuffled in times of social change, the instability of some meaning-configurations and their evolution into others, and dissonances between seemingly authoritative official meanings and on-the-ground popular meanings: in short it allows more subtle typologies and robust explanations of change in collective identity categories. It is also of political importance to recognize patterns of identity change and the conditions which favour or disfavour particular directions of change while change is ongoing, before an old stability of categorical opposition evolves into a new stability of categorical opposition. Just such a period of categorical flux is discussed in the final section of this paper.

In the next section of this paper I argue that the work of Pierre Bourdieu, which incorporates social interaction, institutional structure and subjective meaning, can usefully be developed to deal with identity categories and identity change. On the basis of this discussion, I outline a typology of logically possible responses at the level of identity
to socio-political change. This is intended at once to allow the explanation of patterns of change in terms of wider social processes and resource distribution, while remaining open to the sense and complexity of experience, and the moments of choice (and the constraints on choice) which arise in social transformations. I then show how these responses are exemplified in one contemporary case of politically-engineered change – Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement. Most of the examples in the paper are about changes in national categorizations, although the argument is intended as a more general one.

**Collective categories and the formation of identity.**

*Collective categories of identity*

As has been shown in a number of important recent articles, a range of contemporary scholarship has converged in highlighting personal variability and new combinations of meanings in identity categories and moments of choice or intentionality in identity formation, as exemplified in individual life stories.\(^{17}\) This ‘soft constructivist’ analysis decisively breaks with the notion of identity-categories as fixed and defined, as concepts into which individuals fit. Just as there is no longer any hegemonic cultural order, so there are no longer any hegemonically defined identity-categories – national or otherwise.\(^{18}\) It emphasises the fluctuating, relational and situational quality of self-definitions which are constructed in social practice and interaction, not in depth psychology.\(^{19}\)
Brubaker and Cooper show, however, that this approach can easily become conceptually incoherent. Identity becomes plural, identities proliferate, varying in each situation where a new aspect of self is performed. ‘Identity-language’ classically referred to the stability of the self through a succession of roles; once ‘identity’ is unmoored from such individual stability, it loses its raison d’être. It also loses its usefulness for the analysis of social transformations. If we think of identity in terms of multiple, free-floating macro-categories which individuals may choose to emphasise or ignore, depending on charismatic orators, calculations of strategic self-interest, the needs of particular situations, their degree of suggestibility at any point in time, identity change loses any claim to be a significant part of the causal patterning of social change. It becomes no more than interactional change, epiphenomenal.

If, however, we take seriously the view that collective categories of identity play a significant causal role in framing action, and if we posit a slowly changing ‘cultural sub-stratum’ which may underlie more radical category change, we need a different model of how identity-categories function. We need to recognize not just the complex and varying meanings of these categories and their lack of fixed or foundational status, but also their social ‘embeddedness’ and their personal ‘anchorage’, which allow change or stasis to occur out of phase with other variables, and to affect them in turn. Pierre Bourdieu’s work provides just such a model. In what follows I outline the importance of his perspective for the task set out in this paper, and then show that it must be adapted to cope with social transformation (rather than the social reproduction which he analysed), to allow for the ‘moment of intentionality’ and to analyse identity formation and change.
(rather than the broader concept of the habitus). This falls well short of a theory of identity change, but it allows the identification of conditions that are likely to provoke change in particular identity categories, the development of a typology of ways that this change may proceed and of hypotheses about the conditions that make it likely that it proceeds in one direction rather than another.  

Habitus, social practice and identity

Pierre Bourdieu has shown how the social patterning of individual subjectivity and categorization takes place. He has given a powerful theory of social reproduction whereby individuals internalize the distinctions and values which structure the social world, and then, acting spontaneously in the light of these distinctions, reproduce the social structure whose meanings they have internalized. He has analysed how the habitus – dispositions which give bodily form to collective categories and distinctions - is formed from earliest childhood, as the child situates itself in structured, gendered and differentially path-ed social space, and internalises its objective life-chances in its own subjective expectations and interests. Such processes produce a set of cumulative, superimposed meanings, dispositions and modes of perception embodied in the individual. Some of these may be laid down in infancy but they are social products, even if they sometimes appear to individuals as ‘primordial’ givens. Social practice is at the core of his analysis; it is where individuals at once encounter and internalize distinction, and where, even in new situations, the habitus reproduces socially structured distinction and ensures historical continuity as if spontaneously. Through this...
process, collective categories are interrelated in understanding and habitus just as they are institutionally. The precise set of such interrelations from any particular standpoint in any particular society gives the subjective possibility of shared experience. This is differentiated in national, class, gender, regional and local terms, so that ‘being English’ differs from different class standpoints, and also from different gender, regional and local perspectives, just as class belonging takes specific national, ethnic, gender, regional and local forms. These are not, on Bourdieu’s view, multiple ‘identities’ which one wears and changes, but rather the overlapping categories merge into particular and distinctive forms of habitus.

Bourdieu moves decisively beyond many of the dichotomies which characterize contemporary writing on identity. Individual and social identity, instrumental and affective modes of identification are intrinsically interrelated in his writing. Collective categories are embodied in the individual habitus and expressed not simply in collective action but also in the subtler signs of individual distinction, down to the choice of jewellery, make-up and clothing. This reproduces collective distinction at the micro-level, ensuring that spontaneous attraction and friendship, marriage and family relations tend to fall within collective categories. All such embodied collective categories bring with them a felt immediacy. All give the potential for immediate contact with others whom we recognize as ‘like ourselves’, and a related sense of belonging with those who share our categories and who recognize and respond positively to our immediate intuitive distinctions. But while, in practice, the embodied categories carry this emotional charge,
analytically the formation of shared experiences and the ‘warm’ sense of group belonging and solidarity may be explained coolly, in terms of core social variables.

Bourdieu’s theory, in these respects, provides an invaluable starting-point for analysis of identity. It has, however, been criticized for its failure to explain change and to account for variation.\textsuperscript{32} Whether or not these criticisms are accurate of Bourdieu’s work as a whole is a question beyond the scope of this paper.\textsuperscript{33} They do, however, show that the preliminary schema presented above requires refinement. That schema appears to explain social reproduction and social evolution but not radical social change.\textsuperscript{34} It appears that such change can only come from outside intervention or the impingement of wider processes, since internal feedback patterns ensure the reproduction of both the habitus and the social order. Radical cultural change can, it seems, only be the delayed result of such imposed social change.\textsuperscript{35} However, if this is the only source of cultural or categorical change, it may be signally ineffective, since new elements may be ‘indigenised’ by social practices determined by older distinctions. This practice, well theorized by Bourdieu, is a common phenomenon in deeply divided societies where actors are able to incorporate new resources brought by potentially radical social transformations such as industrialization or democratization or European integration within the divided social structure.\textsuperscript{36}

Part of the problem lies in the positing of one dominant social and symbolic order. In complex modern societies, there may be several competing symbolic orders coexisting in tension within specific institutions or ‘fields’, not just one authoritative system.\textsuperscript{37} Studies
of the state show, for example, different sets of policy orientations and different key conceptual oppositions embedded in different state institutions and sometimes competing within them.\textsuperscript{38} Class distinction too may be experienced and produced in different ways: Lamont’s studies show that bourgeois individuals may choose to define themselves in terms of ethical rather than cultural or material distinction and this choice does not appear to follow the particular bourgeois ‘fraction’ to which the individuals belong.\textsuperscript{39} More radically again, there are some societies where one finds not just contested variants of one symbolic order but at least two different symbolic orders within deeply contested social institutions. This is most evident when one moves from class to ethno-national or religious divisions. In situations where two groups with their already formed symbolic systems are brought into conflict, the distinct cultural substance associated with each is not lost, even when one group gains decisive socio-political control. The symbolic orders tend to become formally homologous – precisely because the dominated order must answer and oppose each aspect of the dominant - yet they retain distinct cultural substance.\textsuperscript{40} It follows that what the child, or adult, internalizes from their social practice may be alternate rather than official meanings, recessive aspects of the social order, implicit contradictions between one set of practices and another. What is embodied in the habitus is a transposition of (and in some circumstances an alternative to) the distinctions of the ‘dominant social order’, and it may come more or less into tension with it.

There is also a tendency to narrow the ‘grammar’ of the habitus to a set of binary oppositions based on power relations. Bourdieu’s explanation of social reproduction centers on the role of structured social practice as the mechanism by which objective life-
chances are transposed into the habitus. More than binary oppositions are thus constituted as dispositions. Complex social practices typically involve at once relations with others (which can build cooperative capacity, skills and virtues) and relations against others (which mark one off from those outside).\textsuperscript{41} The point is clear in Bourdieu’s own empirical studies of crafted interactional patterns or the forming of aesthetic taste.\textsuperscript{42} Yet the real values, and sometimes also virtues, associated with these practices are subsumed within class distinction, and not prioritized in his analysis.\textsuperscript{43} Thus one of the internal tensions within the individual habitus – and another potential source of change - is elided. For example, ethno-national distinction is built both from participation-with-others in institutions and social practices, and by exclusion-of-others from these institutions and practices: at once from the multitude of everyday practices and norms that make up ‘banal nationalism’ and from an institutionally credited ranking of these practices which defines the value of cultural capital and constitutes a set of power resources for some and against others.\textsuperscript{44} National identity at once involves positive values, which grow out of participation and mutual dependence, and implicit oppositions with lesser nations.\textsuperscript{45} Similarly, in deeply divided societies, ethnic categories are mutually opposed, yet they also resonate with values derived from specific traditions and practices.\textsuperscript{46} Ethnic and national conflict is all the more intense because the actors know that what is at stake is not empty categories or mere power, but also real values rooted in specific traditions.

When we move from consideration of the national category of identity to the interrelations of nationality, class, gender, familial, career and other categories, the possibility of internal tension within the habitus increases. While, in principle, one is not gendered separately from being national or from being a member of a given class, the
contents and values associated with each category take different prominence in different fields and may co-exist in considerable tension.

A third general point arises from the fact that Bourdieu’s work centred on the habitus, that totality of dispositions produced without conscious intent. Identity, however, is not the habitus: there is too much in the habitus, much of it below the level of consciousness, much irrelevant to how one conceives of oneself. The habitus rather gives a substratum from which identity is formed in a process of arrangement and rearrangement of some of these elements of embodied meaning and value, with some held close to the centre of self, others left on the margins. Identity-narratives are the reports of – sometimes the performance of – the arrangement and rearrangement of these blocks of meaning.

Identity formation and change is thus a continuous process which involves a considerable degree of intentionality. It takes place by the incorporation of new elements of embodied, meaning and value, or the rearrangement of old. New elements may be created, not ex nihilo but by the choice to foreground particular practices and relations rather than others, so that over time the meanings embedded in these practices become an integral part of the self, while others fade. Such choices are not costless: after years of work and sacrifice, one may find that a sense of belonging in one’s adopted society still eludes one; similarly, old meanings may be marginalized but never totally fade. By the same sort of process, this time combining social practices in new ways, new combinations of meanings can come into being. Again, choice is typically constrained, on the one hand by socially entrenched symbolic codes and multiple social pressures not to break them, and on the other hand by personal history which may have laid down some dispositions so early in
infancy that they are changeable, if at all, only by depth analysis. Complex patterns of identity change may result. When, for example, peripheral nationalist parties in Catalonia or Scotland or Northern Ireland at once oppose the central state and seek involvement in European networks and global linkages, they begin to constitute a hard-edge anti-statist but non-exclusivist, hybrid national identity. If, however, access to European and global networks is restricted until anti-statism is softened, this tends to create a different sort of national-identity-configuration and one which may not meet voter expectations, thus opening the way to future shifts in voter support (from CiU to ERC in Catalonia, from SDLP to Sinn Féin in Northern Ireland).

These points allow us to identify three mechanisms of change in collective categories of identity: dissonances between the social order and the individual habitus; dissonances within the individual habitus; and the moment of intentionality in identity formation. They also allow a more subtle and differentiated analysis of collective identity categories. First, the discussion shows that meaning of collective identity categories is complex, composed of a plurality of elements coexisting in tension. These elements include binary oppositions, substantive values and virtues and normative principles, cognitive assumptions, and understood relations with other categories. Each is derived from meanings embedded in the social structure. A mapping of these elements, and of their typical combinations, can be achieved by focused research.

Second, there are diverse ways of constructing identity categories. The elements may be intertwined in different permutations and combinations with varying degrees of tension.
The meanings of these categories cannot therefore be read off from dominant political discourses: there may be numerous ways to ‘be Irish’ or ‘be Basque’, quite different from ‘official’ views, pursued spontaneously by different groups and sub-sets of groups and individuals, combining differently regional, local, gender, age, class, religious and cultural stances. These may not adequately be represented by politicized contest in the public sphere, yet they are in no sense ‘private languages’ of purely personal significance; each variant may be recognizable within the culture and appeal to particular historical traditions within it. Arguably this divergence of popular and ‘official’ categorical identification, and variation and flux at the popular level, is a phenomenon of the contemporary age, experienced by many individuals reassessing their options in societies experiencing economic restructuring, europeanisation, globalisation and new phases of immigration.

Third, there is a ‘moment’ of intentionality in the making and remaking of identity categories, a choice of which permutations and combinations of elements to accept. This choice is, however, highly qualified. Its exercise may require a high level of cultural and social resources. For example, to distinguish oppositional aspects of national categories from the cultural substance of these categories when both are conflated in one’s identity requires considerable cultural resources and intellectual stamina, while to separate the meanings in public interactions may require unusual courage. To engage in new social practices which allow a recombination of meanings requires institutional and social opportunities. Change may be achieved only at high personal cost: as elements of meaning are centred or decentred, the interpretation of key episodes in the past in which
these meanings came into play may also be changed, and the sense of self affected.\textsuperscript{54} Cultural and social resources, not least in the form of public acknowledgement of the costs of wide-spread change and public recognition of multiple perspectives on the past, can aid such processes of change.\textsuperscript{55} The form and distribution of key social and cultural resources, therefore, are among the determinants of the likely directions of change in identity categories.

Fourth, change in collective identity categories is on-going. Individuals and sets of individuals often find their intuitive categorizations out of phase with those of their class or group, and still more so with official, state-centred categorizations, or they find that the elements of their own categorizations come into internal tension. Unease, personal discontent and revision of category structures proceeds, sometimes independent of, sometimes cohering with, sometimes appealing to new modes of identity-construction put forward by political or communal entrepreneurs.\textsuperscript{56} More radical, society-wide identity change is provoked when socio-political changes bring the elements of collective identity categories into evident contradiction for whole populations. Then individuals are forced to re-sort the elements of their identity. Which directions are chosen depends in part on the prior processes of gradual identity reconstruction within the population, in part on available new resources. When whole populations face such choices, the directions chosen have major political effects.
Social-political change and identity change

Modes of identity transformation

A key cause of change in categories of collective identity is social change. In a society structured throughout by a key set of power relations, radical change in these relations will also cast in doubt the oppositional elements of the collective identity category and their interrelations with other elements. Where, for example, economic position has been correlated with racial or ethnic or gender categories, effective fair employment practices change the ‘entry tickets’ to economic positions and with them the socially sanctioned interrelation of these categories with meritocratic norms and pride in achievement. With the official recognition of the value of minority or dominated cultures, the socially sanctioned association of particular cultural categories with norms of progress, civility or rationality are ‘decertified’. With new actors in positions of power, the networks of informal influence change, and with them socially sanctioned expectations of having, or not having, an authoritative voice in society. Where identity has been entwined with power, these changes are experienced not simply as a change of regime, but – for the dominant group - as an overturning of the moral order, an insult to their own integrity and identity, a placing of the undeserving above the deserving. It is a particularly sharp form of dissonance, where the world is not ordered as they had come to expect, and where these expectations were constitutive of their sense of themselves. Those who have long opposed the dominant order may also find that change disrupts the categories in terms of which they had defined themselves. Others, already uneasy with the dominant categorical oppositions, will welcome the opportunity to move beyond them.
If identity shift is predictable in these circumstances, the form, direction and phasing of that shift is likely to vary depending on the resources available for identity change. Table One, below, distinguishes responses in terms of the extent of change and the way in which it is expressed in practice. Even those responses which begin by refusing identity change tend to introduce new elements and tensions into identity-content.

**TABLE ONE: DIRECTION OF CHANGE IN COLLECTIVE IDENTITY CATEGORIES**

<table>
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<tr>
<th>No change:</th>
<th>Partial change:</th>
<th>Total change:</th>
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<tr>
<td>Transparence and coherence between practice and category</td>
<td>Reaffirmation</td>
<td>Assimilation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity and tension between practice and category</td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
<td>Ritual appropriation</td>
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- **Reaffirmation**  This option reaffirms the existing core binary oppositions and welcomes or resists change in their name. For those who have benefited, the elements within the identity-category may be reaffirmed because they sense they are winning, they are ‘on a roll’, ready to seize the chance to give public prominence to their values, ideas, and concepts at the expense of their former
superiors. Those who were once dominant, in contrast, reaffirm their categories in the very process of resisting change. In some cases, where those who resist set up their own networks and social mechanisms of mutual support (as did the French resistance in WWII), the resistance option may be self-confirming. In other cases, resistance introduces new elements into the identity structure: the experience of marginalisation, the practice of conservation and the threat of extinction produce quite different cognitive assumptions, meanings and values than did the previous experience of successful, expansive social interaction. In some cases, where those who resist set up their own networks and social mechanisms of mutual support (as did the French resistance in WWII), the resistance option may be self-confirming. In other cases, resistance introduces new elements into the identity structure: the experience of marginalisation, the practice of conservation and the threat of extinction produce quite different cognitive assumptions, meanings and values than did the previous experience of successful, expansive social interaction. In some cases, where those who resist set up their own networks and social mechanisms of mutual support (as did the French resistance in WWII), the resistance option may be self-confirming. In other cases, resistance introduces new elements into the identity structure: the experience of marginalisation, the practice of conservation and the threat of extinction produce quite different cognitive assumptions, meanings and values than did the previous experience of successful, expansive social interaction. In some cases, where those who resist set up their own networks and social mechanisms of mutual support (as did the French resistance in WWII), the resistance option may be self-confirming. In other cases, resistance introduces new elements into the identity structure: the experience of marginalisation, the practice of conservation and the threat of extinction produce quite different cognitive assumptions, meanings and values than did the previous experience of successful, expansive social interaction.

Sometimes, too, key elements of the old identity-categories may be eroded - respect for authority, the belief in progress, the sense of order and the expectation of influence are unlikely to survive social marginalisation and sustained opposition. In these cases, while the oppositional aspect of the collective identity category is retained, its evaluative content, core assumptions and relations with other categories change, sometimes to the extent that the identity-structure collapses and reaffirmation turns to conversion.

- **Conversion.** For those who were once-dominated and who constructed their identity against the dominant order, as for those who were once-dominant, structural change may render irrelevant older categorical oppositions. As the linkages between the elements of the identity-category collapse, and as many of the old elements are sensed as absurd in the new situation, the symbolic grammar embedded in the new order may simply be accepted as a package, in a form of conversion. Of course converts must also find within themselves the capacity to
work within the new categories, or else they will be liable to disillusion and further change. The stability of conversion depends on how far the substratum of individual dispositions may be reordered within the new structure. In some dramatic and seemingly sudden cases of category change, for example with whites during the South African transition, the conditions for change had long been prepared in the increasing lack of fit of categories of practice, in inchoate unease as self-perceptions did not meet the perceptions of others, in the strain of holding to an ideology which no longer met either interests or experience.\(^{59}\)

- **Privatisation.** An alternative to conversion, when older oppositional categories and meanings are thrust into irrelevance or official disapprobation but the new categories implicit in practice cannot be accepted, is privatization. This option rearranges the elements of identity, marginalizing all macro-social elements, all national, political, class and status categorizations, shrinking the core of identity into the private, the familial, perhaps also the religious sphere. This option requires strong family linkages, private cultural and social resources or religious faith (or alternatively, enough spending power to move to a consumerist individualism). Collective categories may not fully be rejected but narrowed to the personal sphere: religion becomes pietism and prayer; national identity shrinks to a personal or familial enjoyment of national culture.\(^{60}\) This option has been described in numerous autobiographies of people living in fascist or authoritarian regimes. The pushing aside of collective categories of identity may not be a total rejection of them, simply a making of them recessive, thus allowing
persons to live relatively happy personal lives under regimes which are alien to
them while re-appropriating the older elements when it becomes possible so to
do. In this latter case, privatization begins to converge with adaptation. In other
cases, privatization may become impossible if ascribed collective categories
affect even the pursuit of private happiness.

- **Adaptation.** In this case, actors adapt to the practices required in the new social
order without changing the core elements of their identity. They are ‘sensible’
and agree that the new is here to stay, but they ‘act’ in it while keeping their own
values and self-categorisations distinct from this practice. Equally, they keep at a
distance the meanings and values embedded in their new social practice, ensuring
that they do not touch their core identity. Examples may be found in many social
groups in Franco’s Spain: Catalans who acted prudently but retained their older
values and identity and seized the opportunity for change when it came. In this
case, however, the meanings embodied in their newly adaptive social practice
remain a second language whose logic and rationale always remain alien;
adaptation is always grudging, incomplete, with signs of the older values and
oppositions always likely to appear.

- **Assimilation.** In this case, actors reshuffle the elements of identity, marginalizing
some binary oppositions which were associated with the old social order, placing
other categories closer to the centre of identity; differentiating the substantive
cultural meanings of, for example, ethnicity from associated oppositions based on
status and power hierarchies and retaining the former while casting out the latter. They thus find in themselves the dispositions and expectations necessary to succeed in the new order, while retaining a sense of continuity with their older selves. This is autonomous development of identity, not conversion or the unwelcome intrusion of new elements. This assimilationist option is only open to those who have already available to them, as second nature, elements of value and meaning consistent with the new practices which they can foreground without a sense of total personal upheaval. It was the option taken, for example, by those in old East Germany who responded to unification not by adopting neo-liberal values (conversion), nor by resistance or denial (adaptation) but by combining their own entrepreneurial aims and skills with the strong sense of and valuation of linkages which had been built up in the old regime, thereby retaining a level of continuity with the old (East) German-ness while adapting successfully to the new.  

• **Ritual appropriation.** In this option, new practices are accepted and assimilated within old narrative forms and ritual structures which are used to legitimate, appropriate and redefine the practices, thus assuring continuity of meaning despite change in practice. Unlike adaptation, however, the new practices and the older categories are not held apart but mutually affect one another, so that the tensions and contradictions between the new elements of meaning and the older categorical oppositions play themselves out in practice. This is explicitly a group-centred rather than an individual response to change; it is how ‘nations’
and the individuals within them modernize while retaining a sense of national
tradition and community. So, for example, the expansive neo-imperial tradition
which once constituted the symbolic content of Britishness is continued ritually
by the British royal family’s involvement in the Commonwealth, although the
changed practical significance of the British world role has given both ritual and
identity new meanings and ones which threaten – for example in the transition-
crises of the British royal family – to break the older ritual form.

In each of the cases outlined above, change may not affect the collective categories of
identification: self-reported identity as German or French may remain. It does, however,
affect the meanings, interrelations and salience of the collective categories and their role
in social practice, sometimes in very radical ways.

Transforming identities in Northern Ireland

Contemporary Northern Ireland is a case where major socio-political change associated
with the recent peace process and 1998 settlement is triggering shifts and strains in the
content of national identity categories. This in turn is reacting back on the political
process, producing crises in the process of implementation of the 1998 Agreement and in
the institutions set up by it. In this dynamic situation, identity change is an important part
of the causal chain. But to recognize this requires a notion of identity as inertial, out of
phase with interaction yet open to quantum-leaps of change. This is precisely the concept
sketched above.
Identity shift was to be expected in Northern Ireland. Changes in the British and Irish states and in Northern Ireland itself were increasingly disconfirming the oppositional character of national categories there. These changes were spread over some fifteen years, impinging on individuals at different phases.\(^{67}\) It is useful, however, to take the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 as a turning point, because reform policies underway since 1985 intensified with the Agreement.\(^{68}\) In effect, ongoing changes which were gradually ameliorating the inequality experienced by Catholics and the political and cultural marginalisation of Irish nationalists in Northern Ireland climaxed in 1998 in an Agreement which promised a strongly egalitarian settlement, economically, politically and nationally.

For long, unionists had understood being British in Northern Ireland in terms of a set of binary oppositions which were derived from their role as representatives of British power, law, order and justice in Northern Ireland. This role was institutionalized – unionists had long monopolized positions in the state, civil service, judiciary and police force – and it was expressed in a whole range of discourses, writings and symbolic practices – they were loyal to the Crown against traitors and disloyal Irish nationalists, they were modernizers and realists, aligning with British global power rather than pursuing backward nationalist dreams.\(^{69}\) Unionism varied in its practical and ideological expressions: the habitus of the senior, British-oriented civil servant and his judgements on socially necessary policies differed from those of the part-time rural policeman and of the populist politician.\(^{70}\) Yet, at least until the 1990s, even the most liberal variants of
unionism implicitly repeated the old binaries. Similarly with nationalism and republicanism. A multiplicity, plurality and increasing reflexivity in what it meant to be Irish, evidenced in interviews and in writings, coexisted with a continuing tendency to see being Irish in opposition to being British and to associate it with resistance to unjust power. Constitutional nationalism radically changed its ideological structure, but remained open to interpretation in terms of the classic binaries; republicanism underwent major strategic and social changes but retained the binary oppositions of British vs Irish; assimilation vs resistance, compromise vs idealism, corruption vs purity.

The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 signaled change in the basic power-configuration in Northern Ireland, and in the British state’s role in this. The strongly consociational devolved administration equalized the influence of unionists and nationalists, not just for the present but for the longer term, so that republicans and nationalists, as well as unionists, would be responsible for law-making and eventually also law-enforcement in Northern Ireland. Provisions for reform of security, rights, criminal justice and employment equality meant that the state could no longer be dependent on the Protestant and unionist community for policing and administration. The commitment to parity of esteem in Northern Ireland meant that the British state presence would no longer ‘certify’ the value and meanings embodied in Protestant and unionist rather than Catholic and nationalist practices.

The Irish state itself, in part through increasing affluence and European integration, in part through effective diplomatic activity, had emerged as a proactive and modernizing
player in the Northern Ireland conflict, and a check against the unintended bias of the
British state. Meanwhile the British state with Tony Blair in control was initiating a
process of devolution in Scotland and Wales and a new Europeanist and pluralizing
political discourse. This formed a context where the older oppositions within Northern
Ireland were increasingly at odds at once with the reality of the two states and with the
dominant senses of nationality and emerging national habitus within each. The effect was
to intensify unease and the sense within Northern Ireland that identity structures there
were out of phase with social practice or, perhaps, with modern life.

The Good Friday Agreement, both in its egalitarian institutions and its intergovernmental
frame, might have been predicted to cast unionist and republican binaries in doubt. Many
unionists saw a world turned upside down. They divided almost equally between those
willing to (try to) accept this new world, and those who resisted it. Republicans too had
to reconceive their place in Northern Ireland. Yet if identity shift was fully predictable,
much of the scholarly literature has failed to recognize it, and some have argued that
there has been no change in national identity. This seeming paradox is easily explained
by the fact that many scholars work solely with macro-categories of national identity.
Table Two shows that there has been little significant change in these categories of self-
reported national identity among either Protestants or Catholics since 1978; nor is there
significant change when the results are differentiated by gender or by class. Only
among youth has there been significant change in the macro-categories since the
Agreement, with Catholic youth (77% of 16 year olds) more likely to declare themselves
Irish than older generations, and a significant section of Protestant youth (33% of 16 year olds) now self-identifying as Northern Irish.\textsuperscript{79}

**TABLE TWO: SELF-REPORTED IDENTITY: NORTHERN IRELAND\textsuperscript{80}**

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Only when we look beyond the self-reported national categories, can the extent of identity change be recognized. It has, for the most part, taken place in the content of each category rather than involving change between categories. The typology set out in table one above allows us to differentiate and clarify the directions of change and the possibilities of further change and to give a tentative explanation for this differentiation in terms of the cultural and social resources of the groups in question.
One cluster of Protestants has assimilated to the new order.\textsuperscript{81} They welcome the stability that it promises and the new institutions allow them to maintain the British linkages that they value, while also building potentially useful Irish linkages.\textsuperscript{82} They no longer see the point of striving for absolute sovereignty for the British state in Northern Ireland and they have moved away from a notion of British identity as essentially opposed to Irish identity while keeping what they see as the valuable cultural substance of that identity. For some, this change long preceded the Agreement and was newly certified by it.\textsuperscript{83} For others, the Agreement triggered change. Its provisions (accepting republicans in government, freeing paramilitary prisoners) went against dispositions embodied in the habitus and were intuitively sensed as morally abhorrent. Yet this group still found within themselves the resources to affirm the Agreement. Arthur Aughey, after Lampedusa, speaks of unionists having to ‘swallow the toad’ of the Agreement in order to attain the goal of a ‘civil’ society.\textsuperscript{84} For Aughey, one deciding factor is moral-political principle: the good of agreement outweighs the moral distaste at the means to it. For other unionists, the deciding factor was practical: the need to secure the union and ‘get down to business’.\textsuperscript{85} Others found a religious reason for going beyond their immediate reactions and opting for settlement.\textsuperscript{86} For still others, their contacts with nationalists and republicans in civil society organizations allowed them to de-demonise these political parties and to accept coalition with them, while continuing to disagree with them politically.\textsuperscript{87} In all of these cases, values or principles deep-set in habitus, which may in the past have sat in some tension with political self-understandings, were called upon in the re-invention of a British identity and unionist politics consistent with the Agreement.
Only a small section of these supporters of the Agreement have changed national categories, and even fewer have changed both category and content.\textsuperscript{88} They have assimilated, not converted, finding dispositions and values in themselves which they foreground, which justify the forms of interaction and opportunities opened to them in the new situation. It is significant that this section of the population includes the richer, more mobile, more educated section of Northern Irish Protestants, who have the economic opportunities, social linkages and cultural resources to reconstruct identity more effectively than the marginalized working class and to benefit by so doing. Analysis of the survey data shows that support for the Agreement rises with social class and is strongest in the professional and managerial sectors. Indeed the business community, represented by the Confederation of British Industry in Northern Ireland, welcomed the Agreement and campaigned for a ‘yes’ vote in the 1998 referendum. Individuals in the working class have also assimilated, but in much lesser proportions.\textsuperscript{89}

Other Protestants have privatized. The changes brought by the Agreement have impinged strongly on their identity and they have reacted by withdrawing from politics, turning to God, to family or to consumption. Increasing numbers – particularly among lower social classes, and most prevalent in the skilled manual working class - say they would not vote at another referendum on the Agreement.\textsuperscript{90} The elections of 2003 saw a low turn-out and a much commented-upon public indifference. Claire Mitchell, on the basis of qualitative interviews, has noted an increasing privatization among the Protestant population.\textsuperscript{91} For some of Gladys Ganiel’s interviewees, the response to the new order is a turn inwards, to
a pietistic concern with God’s values, rather than an assertion of these values in the political arena.\textsuperscript{92} Privatisation, however, requires personal resources – familial, religious, career or material resources – and is a costly option for those whose social investments have been in communal activity and solidarity. It may be an interim phase, a period when identity change too difficult or dangerous to accomplish publicly may be tested and controlled in a safe environment.\textsuperscript{93}

Another set of Protestants resisted the Agreement. About half of the skilled manual working class – traditionally the most assertive of unionists - voted against, but it is among the unskilled that support for the Agreement has fallen off most rapidly.\textsuperscript{94} This section of the population has been increasingly marginalized politically and economically and cannot avail of the new opportunities presented by the Agreement. Instead they see their jobs, status, and even their territory diminished with Catholic equality and demographic growth. In the past, they found status and meaning in identification with their immediate community in loyalist marches and rituals which are assertions at once of Protestant solidarity and of Protestant superiority.\textsuperscript{95} Some have responded to the Agreement by reasserting the old binary distinctions between Protestant and Catholic, loyal and disloyal, righteous and unrighteous. They have protested against the Agreement, they have joined paramilitary groups, they have marched at Drumcree against government bans on their ‘Orange’ marches, they have tried to prevent small Catholic schoolgirls walking to school in North Belfast. They have reasserted their identity in the traditional rituals which once expressed Protestant hegemony. But the new order changes the meaning of these rituals. In the past, loyalist rituals served to bind
together large segments of the Protestant community; now they can no longer count on wider Protestant support. In the past, loyalist practices celebrated victory, now they are the last stand of those who have come to define themselves as victims not victors. The resistants are no longer reconstituting their community but are desperately asserting an older set of oppositional meanings that is (quite properly) in process of being wiped out.96

By far the largest section of Protestants, however, adapted. They accepted the Agreement pragmatically, as did the majority of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), or, if they rejected it, they agreed to work within its institutions, as did the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP).97 They saw this as the best way to defend their interests and did not see it as impinging on their identity and beliefs.98 The daily trials and internal fractures of the UUP show the difficulties of this option.99 These unionists, who have worked within the new institutions while holding the core of their own identity stable, have found that their values and expectations have constantly been challenged by the practical demands made upon them. They have tried to be accommodatory, but they are working with conceptual categories in which the old binaries are clearly visible. Because their concept of Britishness is state centred, the ‘parity of esteem’ of national symbols demanded by nationalists seems to them to be radically inappropriate.100 Because their concept of order and authority assumes a continuity with the past, the peace process itself (which has brought ex-paramilitaries into government and required radical reform of the security forces) cannot easily be accepted. Moreover even where one reform package is – with great difficulty - accepted, its logic and rationale are not. The next phase of implementation of the Agreement is therefore opposed just as strongly as the last, and the
UUP appears always to give at best grudging acceptance of the new institutions. It is precisely as if they are applying an inappropriate logic to the institutions of the settlement. The contradiction between the meanings implicit in the institutions and the meanings and assumptions implicit in the identities of those who are key actors within them, is thus permanent, and has created ongoing political crises.

Catholics and nationalists had different and easier sets of choices because, for most, the Agreement represented movement to a situation where it would be easier to sustain their traditional national identification, even in its classic oppositional form. Here, too, however, there was a dynamic of change whose trajectory remains open.

Only a very few rejected and resisted the Agreement, and they – the dissident republicans – quickly yielded to superior force and moved to adaptation. Few, if any, ‘converted’ – the Agreement newly certified Irish identity rather than giving an incentive to move away from it. Some, however, moved toward privatization. Those Catholics whose nationalism was primarily a resistance to unjust rule have responded to change by absorption in ordinary everyday activity, enjoying the peace and the new opportunities opened now that the major problems associated with British rule are being removed.

Moderate nationalists willingly assimilated. They have given up the binary opposition between British and Irish, while retaining much of the cultural substance of Irish identity. These changes had already been prefigured in nationalist ideology, and many nationalists within the SDLP found the new institutional changes confirming and certifying. Others
– previously unconvinced - find the political changes sufficient to allow them to put aside older enmities and even to identify with the category of Britishness in some of its aspects, now that the category of Irishness is also institutionally recognized.\textsuperscript{102} This is aided by contemporaneous changes in the Irish state, where there is now radical openness to influences and inputs from Britain, Europe and the US, where the official notion of Ireland and Irish identity is modernizing and pluralist, and where an opposition of Irish and British identities is no longer prominent, pressing or felt necessary.\textsuperscript{103} Indeed it is a plausible hypothesis that the factors which most favour assimilation among nationalists are linkages with Great Britain, the European Union and, perhaps paradoxically, the Irish state, whose input into Northern Ireland is now more likely to favour assimilation among nationalists than reassertion of exclusivist identities.

Yet there is another side to the Agreement which is also evident in the data. Some nationalists who accept the Agreement find that it confirms their traditional identity. Their Irishness is rising in status in the new institutional context corresponding to an equivalent drop in the status of Britishness.\textsuperscript{104} In this respect, and against the drafters’ intentions, the new institutions may favour and reproduce oppositional aspects of Irish national identity. Survey results suggest that the opposition of Irish and British identity continues for about 60\% of the Catholic population, particularly the young (most likely to declare themselves Irish, least likely to see any British aspect to their identity).\textsuperscript{105} Yet this is not simply a reassertion of older aggressive forms of nationalism. In circumstances where Irish identity no longer has to be asserted against state and official opposition, where cultural activities are now funded and ‘chill factors’ (British flags, military
installations) removed, an evident cultural ‘relaxation’ has occurred in some areas.\textsuperscript{106} Even if the identity of this section of the population is ‘not at all British’, some can now accept cohabitation with a British dimension.

For republicans, however, cohabitation threatens to destabilize identity. The Agreement implies acceptance of the legitimacy of the present status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom and willingness to help administer the expenditure of British money there.\textsuperscript{107} For republicans in the past, an Irish identity carried with it a strong opposition to the British state; the present situation therefore threatens to create cognitive problems parallel to those of unionists. The republican leadership could have opted for a strategy of adaptation. Instead they chose ritual appropriation. They have worked within the new institutional structure, but interpreted the meaning of their new practices in terms of older legitimating symbols and rituals. Thus they have asserted an essential continuity between past and present, and brought with them an increasingly diverse, but predominantly young, working class constituency.\textsuperscript{108} Yet the conceptual oppositions expressed in the older symbols are coming into tension with practices which assume that the path to Irish unity lies in compromise, gradualism and work within British institutions. Dissident republicans and liberal unionists predict that the older republican identity system will collapse (if it has not already done so), and that pro-Agreement republicans will become assimilationist nationalists.\textsuperscript{109} Pro-Agreement republicans portray their practice as that of a new modernizing republicanism which retains its radical thrust. The outcome of this mix of developing symbol-system and developing practical action is not predictable; it is on principle open-ended, allowing a movement towards reflective equilibrium between
identity and practice. Where that equilibrium will lie depends, in large part, on other actors. Increasing resistance and division among unionists (un-reassured by this republican strategy) allows republicans to confirm much of their older identity, while also showing their willingness to reshuffle its elements. Assimilation among unionists would remove the ambiguity from the situation and demand either adaptation or assimilation by republicans.

The changes outlined above are ongoing, worked out in practical life and interactions, conditioned by the uneven distribution of cultural and social resources, sometimes reflected upon and opened to conscious choice. In and between these changes and choices are the multiple ethnic entrepreneurs, political parties and strategic manoevrings of the political process. All of this is important: had the leadership of the pro-Agreement unionists been less grudging in its support for the Agreement, perhaps more unionists would have been won to assimilation from adaptation. Had pro-Agreement republicans adopted a different strategy, there would almost certainly have been a major republican split. But the one lesson that should be learned from over thirty years of conflict in Northern Ireland is that the public does not follow the admonitions of its leaders unless these grasp its own worries and uncertainties and hopes. Before analyzing the impact of political discourse and competition on the public, it is necessary to map the inchoate but discernible trends of change in that public. The map proposed here is in need of development and revision as more research results emerge; it is intended, however, to give a useful framework for that research.
Conclusion

This paper puts forward a Bourdieu-ian perspective that allows us to recognize the embeddedness of identity-categories, their internal complexity, their effects in framing interaction, and the possibility of both gradual and sudden change. It explains identity change in terms of three variables: existing identity structure (the content and constitutive values of the identity category and its relations with other categories), power-relations (as expressed in institutions and institutionally patterned interactions), and resources. The fact of identity change is explained when changing power relations conflict with embedded categorical understandings, expectations and values. The direction of identity change is crucially affected by the resources available to different sectors of the population. The paper sketches a typology of six possible directions of change.

The value of this approach is illustrated in the case of Northern Ireland. The analysis above shows the post-Good-Friday situation in Northern Ireland in flux, not simply politically but also in terms of the meanings of national identity. It explains why pro-Agreement unionists have delayed the process of implementation (because of its threat to the content of their identity categories), and why pro-Agreement republicans have been unable to assuage unionist fears (because of their mode of identity shift). It shows an uneven process of reshuffling of the contents of national identities. In short, it identifies and explains subtle shifts and strains in identity-structure provoked by the Good Friday Agreement, and suggests how they in turn explain the difficulties of implementation of
the Agreement. It predicts farther reaching change, as the costs of retaining older
oppositional concepts of identity increase, as the costs of new choices become clear and
as resources for further change emerge. This sketch of identity change cannot claim to be
definitive. Change is on-going, and the results of relevant research are still coming in;
identity structures may stabilize in tension with existing institutions, while creating
endemic crises in them. Yet this perspective lets us raise the question of identity change,
look at emerging evidence, and evaluate trends. In this, it is superior to other approaches
which either fail to recognize the difficulty of identity change, or fail to recognize its
possibility.

The case study shows the importance of including identity and identity change in the
study of socio-political transformations. Without it, we lose a key factor which
differentiates groups, motivates action and explains the emerging fission of old and
fusion of new clusters of the population. It shows the value of Bourdieu’s approach: the
linking of habitus and power relations explains not only the entrenchment of oppositions
but also the shifts in content of identity categories as habitus is disconfirmed by socio-
structural and political change. It suggests that these processes of identity change follow
discernible patterns, both in terms of the ‘logic’ or ‘rationale’ of possible responses as
given in the typology, and in terms of patterns of resource distribution which predispose
towards one or another choice. Indeed the discussion suggests that trajectories of change
exist, with initial choices tending to develop into others, so that, for example, one pattern
of change leads from reaffirmation through ritual appropriation to assimilation, with the
timing of each phase dependent on social positioning and resources. But to pursue this
line of thought is to go beyond the scope of this article.

It might be questioned if the notion of ‘identity’ is indeed central to the analysis. Could
the whole analysis be rephrased in terms of identifications, values, assumptions and self-
categorisations? The potential price is a loss of the sense of coherence with which
individuals tie together these factors and a lack of recognition of the cost to them in
pulling them apart and reshuffling these elements. The benefit of this analytic perspective
is to link individuals’ reports of their own experience of social and self change to wider
socio-theoretical explanations of change, while retaining the sense and complexity of the
individual’s experience.

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Citizenship programme at ISSC. Herbert Preiss provided research assistance in analysis
of the quantitative data.
4 ‘The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice’, K. Marx and F. Engels, *The German Ideology*, editor C. J. Arthur (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1970), 121. Short of coincidence, however, there are many types of interrelations which require analysis.
5 They expand the role of interpretative framing from that assumed in classic social movement theory: see, for example, the discussion of ‘opportunities and threats’, McAdam et al, *Dynamics of Contention*, 44-7.
6 McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly discuss these aspects of relationality in *Dynamics of Contention*, 57-8. While they focus on the interactive process, and in particular criticize the assumption that identities exist ‘within people’s heads’ (57) they also acknowledge the other aspects, see 274ff, 310, 344. Charles Tilly tends to be more robust in dispensing altogether with the subjective and intentional aspect of individual identity: see C. Tilly, *Stories, Identities and Political Change* (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002). In the present article, individuals and intentionality are brought back in, but explicitly as moments of a broader analysis which interrelates intentionality, institutions and interactions.
9 Tobias Theiler, *Political Symbols and European Integration* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004.)
11 For example, they explain the peaceful character of the Spanish post-Franco transition in part by the movement towards a European identity (McAdam et al, *Dynamics of Contention*, 181-3), but the diversity of, for example, Europeanness, Spanishness, Catalanness, and Basque ness, and of their combinations within Spain from the 1970s to the present, which at once underlies the possibility of consensus on the 1978 constitution and the ongoing contention over it, is elided. On this diversity, see *La Question de L’Espagne, Hérodote: revue de géographie et de géopolitique*, no. 91, 1998. On the expression of these diverse understandings within constitutional debate, see J-M Comas, ‘Spain: the 1978 constitution and centre-periphery tensions’, in J. Ruane, J. Todd and A. Mandeville, editors., *Europe’s Old States in the New World Order: The Politics of Transition in Britain, France and Spain* (Dublin: UCD Press, 2003): 38-61.
The unexpected nature of entrepreneurial success is striking even to the entrepreneurs themselves: a veteran republican activist once described to me (in an interview in 1988) his involvement in the Civil Rights Movement (CRM) in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s. He was involved in the organization of the CRM from the start, as he had been involved in every anti-state or protest movement in Northern Ireland for as long as he could remember. At the time, he saw the civil rights movement as no different, another phase and strategy of anti-state activism: he had no idea that this one was going to have such major consequences.


Brubaker and Cooper, ‘Beyond “identity”’. Taking this notion of identity categories, Tilly rightly sees no point in looking at identity apart from interaction; see Tilly, Stories, Identities and Political Change, 49, 75. Brubaker and Cooper see the very term as dispensable, ‘Beyond identity’, 1-2.


Ashmore et al, ‘An organizing framework’, 83ff. note at least fourteen dimensions of each collective identity category, including salience, affect, group-belonging, as well as different aspects of content, together with the further dimensions of interrelations of categories and their social contextualisation. The present article deals only with the cognitive content and interrelations of collective identity categories, and their relation to the social context.

Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 78-9; Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 58.

Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 86.


Bourdieu, Logic of Practice, 56.


Being male or female is not separate from being Kabyle or being French working class, but rather it forms a way of being Kabyle or French working class.

For a discussion of the opposition between social and individual identity, see Abdelal et al, ‘Identity as a Variable’. The distinction between instrumental and affective modes of identification is pervasive in discussions of ethnic identity, see J. Hutchinson and A. D. Smith, editors Ethnicity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996). On the interrelations, see Bourdieu, Outline of a Theory of Practice, 80-2. For a


34 Gradual social evolution which allows historical continuity through the capacity of the habitus to apply old distinctions in new circumstances is, however, at the core of Bourdieu’s theory. For discussions of this and of more radical change, see, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 95, *Logic of Practice*, 67.

35 But see Crossley, ‘Phenomenological habitus’, 92-3.

36 On the ‘indigenisation’ of new elements through the habitus, see Bourdieu, *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, 78-81. For one set of historical examples, see Ruane and Todd, *Dynamics of Conflict*.

37 Hall, ‘Capital(s) of culture’, points out that the notion of ‘field’ does not resolve the difficulty because a dominant order is presupposed within each field.

38 The very concept of ‘governance’, for example, dispenses with the notion of a central ordering point within the state, in favour of a plurality of disparate potentially competing institutions, embodying different modes of practice and norms, and interlinked in a variety of ways. In a quite different tradition of thought, but referring to comparable phenomena, Marxists point to ‘contradictions’ within the state, see C. Offe, *Contradictions of the Welfare State*, editor John Keane (London: Hutchinson, 1984), or multiple sites of struggle within it, see N. Poulantzas, *State, Power, Socialism* (London: New Left Books, 1978). See also B. Jessop, *The Future of the Capitalist State* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002).


42 Bourdieu, *Distinction*.

43 Although she does not theorise it in these terms, one might say that it is precisely these values which some of Lamont’s interviewees emphasise in *Money, Morals and Manners*.


47 For example, whether and to what extent the meanings and values embedded in work and working relations which colour one’s expectations, perceptions and responses are incorporated into identity varies dramatically depending on the satisfaction and fulfillment or tediousness and alienation associated with work. If the norms and skills of creative professional work can willingly be assumed into identity, routine work can be factored out.

48 Here the notion of the active subject or agent is brought in; for a discussion of why this is necessary and how it is (conceptually) possible, see Crossley, ‘Phenomenological habitus’.

49 Somers, ‘Narrative construction of identity’.
This list of elements parallels three of the elements of identity-content discussed in Abedelal et al., ‘Varieties of identity’ (they mention constitutive norms, relational comparisons and cognitive models as well as social purposes), although I give a rather different reading of each.

This was precisely Bourdieu’s achievement in *Distinction*. Such mapping requires a triangulation of methods: theoretical hypotheses drawn from existing research and comparative work, refined through individual interviews and tested by a range of methods, from surveys to participant observation. See Abedelal et al., ‘Varieties of identity’ for discussion of some relevant methods.

The variants of Irish identity are, for example, satirized in television situation comedies and represented in television drama, associated with different cultural styles, party political loyalties and with identification with different aspects of the Irish national tradition.


On the ontological role of narrative, see Somers, ‘Narrative construction of identity’, eg 618-9, 629-31.


This type of process was evidenced in (unpublished) semi-structured interviews (80 in all) conducted in Northern Ireland in 1988 by the author and a colleague: accessing national identity was one aim of the interviews. There was much individual variation in the contents and values of the same national categories: significant numbers reported periods (sometimes the bloody 1970s, sometimes traumatic social events like the republican hunger-strikes of 1981, sometimes individual experiences of injustice) when they had felt it necessary to rethink their sense of nationality.

On certification and decertification, see McAdam et al, *Dynamics of Contention*, 145-148, 204-7.


Llobera, ‘Commemorations’.


This process of using old linkages to act effectively in a new social order has been much more discussed in the globalisation literature than in the literature on identity: see, for example, S. Lash and J. Urry, *Economies of Signs and Space* (London: Sage, 1994), chapter 4. For an overview of the literature on different responses to reunification in the old East Germany, see Jan Werner Muller. ‘East Germany: Incorporation, Tainted Truth and the Double Division’ in Alexandra Barahona de Brito, Carmen González-Enríquez, Paloma Aguilar, editors, *The Politics of Memory: Transitional Justice in Democratizing Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001): 248-274, 270-274.


I rely here on a range of published studies and research reports of contemporary change in Northern Ireland, referred to below, supplemented by interviews conducted in the late 1980s and since by the author and a colleague and results to date of interviews conducted by the author for the ‘Intergenerational transmission’ research project at ISSC, University College Dublin. Much research has begun since 1998, not all of which is yet completed or published so the analysis here necessarily remains provisional. I thank Joseph Ruane, Claire Mitchell and Gladys Ganiel for discussions about their findings.

For example, ex-loyalist paramilitaries in the new loyalist parties gave very public testimony of change the 1990s, and to a man, dated their changing conceptions to their experiences in prison in previous decades: prison changes loyalists because it pits their self-conception (as defenders of the state) against the palpable reality of power relations (the evident fact that the state is punishing them for their activity). See J. Todd, ‘Two traditions in unionist political culture’, Irish Political Studies 2 (1987): 1-26, 20-1.

On fair employment policy, see C. McCruden, ‘Equality and the Good Friday Agreement’ in J. Ruane and J. Todd, editors After the Good Friday Agreement: Analysing Political Change in Northern Ireland (Dublin: University College Dublin Press, 1999) 96-121. Changes instituted after 1998 also include reform of the policing system, far-reaching guarantees of human rights and ‘parity of esteem’ to be formulated by a new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, reform of the criminal justice system, and support for the Irish and Ulster Scots languages.


On the binary oppositions, see Ruane and Todd, Dynamics of Conflict and Transition, chapter 3. For a clear statement of the liberal unionist position, see Arthur Aughey, Under Siege: Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1989).

On the diversity, see F. O’Connor, In Search of a State: Catholics in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1993). On the continuing binaries, see Ruane and Todd, Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland, chapter 4, and Dynamics of Conflict and Transition, chapter 3.


The point being made here is not that unionists mistrusted Blair or his cabinet or their policies – on some accounts, David Trimble trusted Blair - but that the changes being instituted in Great Britain itself, and in particular the ‘rebranding’ of Britain and Britishness, went against the assumptions about territory, morality and politics embedded in the unionist habitus: see for example Eric Waugh ‘What Cheriegate means to Ulster’, Belfast Telegraph, 18.12.02.

Life and Times surveys, however, show a steady decrease in the percentage of Protestants who supported the Agreement, declining from just over a half in 1998 to less than a third in 2003. Significantly it was the unskilled working class who found the new regime hardest to cope with and among whom support fell off most steeply (from 50% who reported in 1999 that they had voted yes in the referendum the previous year, to 15.4% who would vote yes in 2003). (Life and Times survey results and data are available on the webpage <http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/ visited October 2004). This division also existed at the party political level, between the main unionist parties and within the predominantly pro-Agreement Ulster Unionist Party.

John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, working solely with the macro-categories of national identity and national allegiance, argue that national identities in Northern Ireland are ‘durable’, and criticize as unrealistic those who see them as transformable, Consociational Engagements, 16-24, 32. For an argument that such identifications may be understood at once as durable and transformable, see J. Ruane and J. Todd, ‘The roots of the intense ethnic conflict may not themselves be ethnic: categories, communities and path dependence’, Archives Européennes de Sociologie, 45/2 (2004):209-232.

The biggest single change in self-reported identity occurred among Protestants, over a quarter of whom switched to a British identity between 1968 and 1978. An explanation of this lies beyond the scope of the paper, but it is relevant to note that the criteria used by Protestants may themselves have changed due to the political context – by 1976 they focused on political loyalty rather than on wider cultural issues. For discussion, see E. Moxon-Browne, Nation, Class and Creed in Northern Ireland (Aldershot: Gower, 1983): 6-11. Gender makes no significant difference. In the late 1980s, Catholic identification as Northern Irish was more likely among the higher social classes, but this class differentiation is no longer stark, perhaps reflecting the fact that it is now socially acceptable (rather than politically ‘extreme’) to claim Irish identity. See E. Moxon-Browne, ‘National identity in Northern Ireland’, in P. Stringer and G. Robinson, editors, Social Attitudes in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1991): 23-30; Life and Times, (Northern Ireland ) 1997–2002. Life and Times Survey, website, (community relations module, identity) <http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/.

This is a relatively small minority. No more than a third of Protestants continued to support the Agreement in 2003, and some of these fall in to the category of ‘adaptation’ rather than assimilation. See footnote 76.

From the New Ulster Movement of the late 1960s through the Alliance Party to new ecumenical groups and cross-community parties, there has been a (minority) tradition of Protestants and unionists who took this stance.

These are what Henry Patterson calls the ‘structural unionists’, who are willing to accept change if the structure of the union is secured. H. Patterson, ‘Missing the point’; H. Patterson, ‘The limits of the “new unionism”’. David Trimble and the Ulster Unionist Party, *Eire-Ireland* 39/1&2 (2004): 163-188. One unionist voter exemplified this approach when she said to the author after the first act of republican decommissioning in 2001, ‘they [republicans] have done what we asked for, now let’s get on with it’.

Gladys Ganiel, ‘Conserving or changing? The theology and politics of Northern Irish fundamentalist and evangelical protestants after the Good Friday agreement’, IBIS working paper no. 20, Institute of British Irish Studies, University College Dublin.

Involvement in cross-community civil society organizations is an important factor in moderating conflict in other societies, see A. Varshney, ‘Ethnic conflict and civil society: India and beyond’, *World Politics* 53 (2001): 362-98. This may be because they give resources for identity change. For example, one Protestant woman interviewed by the author in 2004 recounted that the crisis-provoking event which broke her own oppositional categories was tied to her evening classes in an adult education centre: the (personal) crisis arose with the onset of negotiations towards the Agreement, when she learned from the media that her much-liked and respected language teacher was also a high-ranking republican. The resource gained from the civil society organization in this case was the strength of her personal intuitions, which she was able to reconcile with her general political principles only after she had distinguished the latter from her specific political reactions (that republicanism was simply evil).

While occasionally one meets individuals who have switched national category and content, the only significant section of the population to have done so in the recent period is the segment of Protestant youth who have adopted a Northern Irish identity. For analyses, see K. Trew, ‘The Northern Irish Identity’ in A. Kershan, editor, *A Question of Identity*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998: 60-76; L. Dowds and P. Devine, ‘Unleashing the apathy of a lost generation?’ in L. Dowds, P. Devine and R. Breen, editors, *Social Attitudes: the Sixth Report* (Belfast: Appletree, 1997): 47-69.


90 See Life and Times data, [http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/](http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/)
91 Mitchell, ‘Protestant Identification’.
93 The trajectory of future change may well depend on the type of civil society institutions in which these individuals are involved: it is well known, for example, that some sports in Northern Ireland are intra-community, some inter-community, some all-Ireland in organization, with values differing accordingly. See J. Sugden and A. Bairner, *Sport, Sectarianism and Society in a Divided Ireland* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993)
94 See Life and Times data, [http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/](http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/)
97 The DUP quickly moved beyond resistance, but swayed between adaptation and ritual appropriation: on occasion their discourse was against the agreement while they served as ministers within it.
98 This is the category which Patterson calls ‘conservative realists’. See Patterson, ‘Missing the point’, and ‘The limits of the “new unionism”’. 
For a narrative account of the continuing crises within the Ulster Unionist Party, the constant challenges to the pro-Agreement leadership, that party’s delays in joining the institutions set up by the Agreement, and its eventual defeat in the 2003 elections by the Democratic Unionist Party see Northern Ireland monitoring reports (Nations and Regions: Dynamics of Devolution. Constitution Unit website http://www.ucl.ac.uk...).

This is shown in numerous articles by liberal unionist columnists in the pro-Agreement newspaper, The Belfast Telegraph. See for example, Eric Waugh’s column, Belfast Telegraph, 04.07.01.

They had been arguing for them for twenty five years. On nationalist ideology, see J. Todd, ‘The reorientation of constitutional nationalism’ in Coakley, editor, Changing Shades of Orange and Green. 71-83.

About a third of Catholics have a weak sense of British identity which they combine with a sense of Irish identity: the rest either have a strong sense of Britishness and no sense of Irishness (about 10%), or a strong sense of Irishness and no sense of Britishness at all. Just less than half of Protestants have some sense of Irish identity. (Life and Times, 1999: http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/)


By 2001, more Catholics than Protestants felt that their tradition was protectors more Protestants than Catholics felt that they were underdogs, a marked reversal of previous perceptions (Life and Times surveys, http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/)

62% of Catholics in 1999 felt that they were ‘not at all’ British (compared to 51% of Protestants who felt that they were ‘not at all’ Irish), the figure in 1998, the only other time the question was asked was 59% (http://www.ark.ac.uk/nilt/). Shirlow’s interviews in one marginal working class area of Belfast suggest strong oppositionalism there, see Shirlow, ‘Who fears to speak’. However there are no direct correlations between Irish identity and unskilled class status. There is some interview evidence of a reaffirmation of Irish identity in majority Catholic rural areas which had experienced security force harassment, but again there is no direct survey evidence of regional distinctions.

This is how a border Protestant interviewee reported her experience of change in Catholics’ interactions with her family since the Agreement (interview with the author, 2004). It is also acted out symbolically, as when the republican Lord Mayor of Belfast, Alex Maskey laid wreaths to commemorate those who died (including very large numbers of Ulster Protestants) at the Battle of the Somme at war memorials in Thiepval and Guillemont, Sept 2002. It is not the case among those in sectarian interface areas, Shirlow, ‘Who fears to speak’.

For a clear statement of the contradictions, see Ruane. ‘Contemporary republicanism’, and McIntyre, ‘Modern Irish republicanism’.

Support for Sinn Féin has grown steadily, so that in the 2003 Northern Ireland elections they became the largest nationalist party in Northern Ireland.

Paul Bew. ‘The unionists have won, they just don’t know it’, Sunday Times, 17.5.98. McIntyre, ‘Modern Irish republicanism’.